One way congress can influence the economy

He or she is third in the line of succession to the Presidency. Members of the House are elected every two years and must be 25 years of age, a U. The House has several powers assigned exclusively to it, including the power to initiate revenue bills, impeach federal officials, and elect the President in the case of an electoral college tie.

The Senate is composed of Senators, 2 for each state. Until the ratification of the 17th Amendment in , Senators were chosen by state legislatures, not by popular vote. Since then, they have been elected to six-year terms by the people of each state. Senator's terms are staggered so that about one-third of the Senate is up for reelection every two years.

Senators must be 30 years of age, U. The Vice President of the United States serves as President of the Senate and may cast the decisive vote in the event of a tie in the Senate. The Senate has the sole power to confirm those of the President's appointments that require consent, and to ratify treaties. There are, however, two exceptions to this rule: the House must also approve appointments to the Vice Presidency and any treaty that involves foreign trade.

The Senate also tries impeachment cases for federal officials referred to it by the House. In order to pass legislation and send it to the President for his signature, both the House and the Senate must pass the same bill by majority vote. If the President vetoes a bill, they may override his veto by passing the bill again in each chamber with at least two-thirds of each body voting in favor. The first step in the legislative process is the introduction of a bill to Congress.

Anyone can write it, but only members of Congress can introduce legislation. Some important bills are traditionally introduced at the request of the President, such as the annual federal budget.

During the legislative process, however, the initial bill can undergo drastic changes. After being introduced, a bill is referred to the appropriate committee for review. There are 17 Senate committees, with 70 subcommittees, and 23 House committees, with subcommittees.

The first weeks of the th Congress have seen a flurry of budget-related activity, including the re-opening of parts of the federal government after a record day partial shutdown and the passage of a large, omnibus spending bill funding those agencies through the end of September. The start of the th Congress brought a change in majority control of the House, and with it, a shift from unified to divided partisan control of government in Washington.

This particular flavor of divided government—the House controlled by one party and the Senate and the White House held by the other—was last seen between and , when Democrats held the White House and the Senate and Republicans controlled the House. Legislation passed during the last such period—the Budget Control Act BCA of —sets up one of several fiscal policy challenges Congress will have to resolve this year.

The BCA implemented ten years of spending caps for the discretionary budget. Since their enactment, however, Congress has repeatedly—in , , and —chosen to raise the ceiling on spending in two-year increments, with roughly equally sized increases on the defense and non-defense sides of the budget. The most recent of these deals expires at the end of September , which would, absent any other action, lead to spending cuts of roughly 10 percent.

The likelihood of the White House convincing Congress to go along with this proposal are slim. Given their success at insisting on increases to the non-defense caps under unified Republican control in and , Democrats are unlikely to see a reason to back down when they have more power in Congress in the form of a House majority.

Mack Thornberry R-Tex. Other tools, however, are both non-constitutional i. Most of these non-constitutional, non-statutory tools, while capable of influencing agency decisionmaking, cannot themselves legally compel agency action. Congress's power to create agencies is well established. Members of the First Congress viewed the Constitution as contemplating the creation of "departments of an executive nature" to "aid" the President in the execution of law.

The Secretary of the Treasury, for example, had to report directly to Congress, either "in person or in writing," on "all matters referred to him by the Senate or the House. Yet the debates of the First Congress also provide evidence of Congress's acknowledgment of what would become the delicate, and at times uneasy, balance between congressional creation and control of agencies and the President's authority to supervise executive officials pursuant to his constitutional obligation to "Take Care that the laws be faithfully executed.

For example, in Congress engaged in a historically significant debate on the President's authority to remove the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. As reflected in the debates of the First Congress and confirmed by later Supreme Court decisions, Congress's power over the administrative state, though broad, is not unlimited. In particular, constraints on congressional power over executive agencies flow from the foundational constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers.

Although the text of the Constitution distributes the legislative, executive, and judicial powers among the three branches of government, 20 the Supreme Court has not endorsed any absolute separation. The allocation of powers was never intended, in the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, to cause the branches to be "hermetically sealed," 21 or divided into "fields of black and white.

Yet some well-established principles govern the relationship between Congress and the administrative state. For example, Congress may neither displace executive authority by directly implementing the law itself, 24 nor appoint or reserve for itself the power to remove except through impeachment executive officers engaged in the execution of law.

It would appear that the chief substantive limitations on Congress's ability to control the executive branch arise from specific constitutional provisions and implied principles—intimately connected to the separation of powers—that buttress the general division of power among the branches. These provisions and principles, which include the Appointments Clause, the Take Care Clause, and the President's authority to supervise the executive branch, are addressed below in conjunction with Congress's statutory powers.

Congress's ability to control administrative agencies through the exercise of legislative power is a holistic endeavor perhaps best understood as built upon four basic pillars: structural design, delegation of authority, procedural controls on agency decisionmaking, and agency funding. Reliance on each pillar, however, is informed by separation-of-powers principles. How an agency is structured invariably affects how it operates, and what sort of relationship it has with the Congress and the President.

Many of Congress's structural choices affect the independence of agencies by shaping the degree to which the President can assert control over them. These structural choices are wide-ranging, but generally relate to agency leadership, appointment and removal of officers, and presidential supervision. For example, subject to constitutional considerations explained below, Congress may.

Although Congress may wish to insulate an agency from presidential control through these structural choices, fundamental constitutional requirements must be complied with in designing federal agencies. These limits, two of which are discussed below, generally exist to ensure that executive branch officials remain accountable to the President, and ultimately the public, for their actions. The Appointments Clause imposes significant limitations on the structural choices that Congress may make in determining how executive agency officials are appointed.

The breadth of authority that an executive branch official exercises typically determines the official's classification as either an officer or non-officer for Appointments Clause purposes.

Thus, in designing agencies, Congress generally has little discretion in directing the method of appointment for most agency heads.

If an agency head exercises significant authority on a continuing basis and is supervised only by the President, she qualifies as a principal officer and must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

For example, Congress can vest the appointment of an "inferior" agency official in the head of a department or in the "Courts of Law" to either provide an official with some independence from the President or to prevent the President from nominating an official of his own choosing. The President's general authority to supervise and oversee the executive branch also limits the structural choices Congress may make in designing agencies.

These limits are often implicated by statutory provisions that seek to insulate an agency from presidential control by providing agency leaders with removal protections. For example, "for cause" removal protections generally prevent the President from removing an identified official except in cases of "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.

The Supreme Court has established that by vesting the President with both "the executive Power" and the personal responsibility to ensure the faithful execution of the laws, Article II confers upon the presidency the "administrative control" of the executive branch. The Supreme Court has outlined the extent of the President's authority to oversee the executive branch through removal in a series of seminal cases.

The decision of Myers v. United States invalidated a statutory provision that prohibited the President from removing an executive official without first obtaining the advice and consent of the Senate and established the general proposition that Article II grants the President "the general administrative control of those executing the laws, including the power of appointment and removal of executive officers.

United States , 52 when the Court held that Congress could limit the President's ability to remove members of a multi-member commission by providing commissioners with "for cause" removal protections. Olson , this time as applied to the independent counsel, an officer who was authorized to conduct independent investigations and prosecutions of high-level executive officials. The Court most recently assessed the constitutional dimensions of presidential control in Free Enterprise Fund v.

These removal cases impose significant, if somewhat undefined, limitations on Congress's authority to structure an agency to insulate certain officials from presidential control.

In general, an agency has only that authority which has been delegated to it by Congress. Congress's control over agency authority is not limited to initial decisions made when the agency was established.

Instead, the authority delegated to an agency can generally be enlarged, narrowed, or altered at any time by Congress. Congress often uses sunset provisions to terminate a delegation on a specified date. Congress is not, however, unconstrained in its ability to empower agencies. One limitation on Congress's ability to delegate authority to a federal agency is the non-delegation doctrine.

As opposed to the appointment and removal doctrines, which limit Congress's ability to encroach upon or restrict executive authority, the non-delegation doctrine limits the extent to which Congress may bestow legislative authority on other entities, including the executive branch. In practice, the non-delegation doctrine does not, by itself, generally function as a substantial limitation on the powers that Congress may provide to a federal agency.

Congress may also condition an agency's exercise of its delegated authority in various ways. For example, Congress can craft legislation establishing that delegated agency authority is triggered only after a specific event occurs, or after a factual determination made by an executive branch official. Congress has also repeatedly established internal expedited procedures for the rejection of specific agency actions. Congress can also exert substantial control over administrative agencies by prescribing the procedures agencies must employ when exercising delegated powers.

The Administrative Procedure Act APA , 87 enacted in , is perhaps the most prominent federal administrative procedure statute. The APA sets forth the default procedural rules with which federal agencies 88 must comply when crafting and issuing regulations termed "rules" by the APA 89 and conducting adjudicatory proceedings. The power to issue binding law through notice-and-comment rulemaking 92 or administrative adjudication or both 93 is one of the most consequential powers with which many agencies are imbued.

The APA prescribes default procedural requirements with which agencies must comply when conducting rulemaking and adjudication proceedings. The APA is not the only statute that governs administrative procedure. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Congress exercises virtually plenary control over agency funding. Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to tax and spend in order to provide for the "Common Defence and general Welfare of the United States," and provides explicitly that "[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.

Along with the power to determine general funding levels for agencies and programs, Congress may also prohibit or condition the use of funds to control agency activity or achieve certain policy goals. Given the legislative branch's clear constitutional power over the purse, the Supreme Court has recognized that "Congress may always circumscribe agency discretion to allocate resources by putting restrictions in the operative statutes. A typical rider prohibits an agency from using funds to implement a certain action and potentially can transform how a federal agency implements the law.

For example, Congress has used appropriations riders to limit agency action on issues ranging from the enforcement of federal marijuana laws to the transfer of detainees from the U. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay. But while Congress's power of the purse is almost plenary, it cannot be used to achieve unconstitutional purposes.

United States , the Supreme Court held that Congress cannot wield its appropriations power to punish specific government officials in violation of the Bill of Attainder Clause. The above discussion establishes Congress's broad authority to control federal agencies by enacting legislation. These statutory tools, however, may be exercised only under Congress's lawmaking power, which requires the participation and agreement of the House, Senate, and, absent a veto override, the President.

The Constitution's required lawmaking procedures impose significant limitations on how Congress and its component parts i. The Supreme Court has made clear that Congress must exercise its legislative power in compliance with the "finely wrought and exhaustively considered[] procedure" set forth in Article I, Section 7, which provides that "every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States.

Chadha is the seminal case on the limits bicameralism and presentment place on the ability of Congress's component parts to act alone. The Chadha opinion identified specific exceptions to the bicameralism and presentment requirement, noting that "[c]learly, when the [Constitution's] Draftsmen sought to confer special powers on one House, independent of the other House, or of the President, they did so in explicit, unambiguous terms.

As a result of the Chadha decision, if Congress seeks to legally compel or prohibit agency action, or otherwise alter an agency's underlying authority, the House and Senate generally must act in concert with each other, and absent a veto override, in concert with the President.

The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted Chadha as limiting the legal impact of non-statutory legislative actions. For example, in Bowsher v. Synar , the Court reaffirmed that "once Congress makes its choice in enacting legislation, its participation ends.

Congress can thereafter control the execution of its enactment only indirectly—by passing new legislation. These tools may inhere to the House, Senate, congressional committees, or individual Members. Some of the most significant non-statutory tools are available to both houses of Congress. Three tools have particular practical or legal significance to Congress: expressions of disapproval, including censure; criminal contempt of Congress; and each house's inherent power to arrest and jail individuals for obstructive conduct.

Either house of Congress may seek to influence agency action through formal disapproval of executive branch officials. Formal declarations of disapproval take different forms. They can be expressions of censure or condemnation, declarations of a loss of or no confidence in an official, or expressions of the belief that an official should resign or be removed from office.

Congress has proposed resolutions condemning or censuring executive branch officials since as early as , when Congress considered resolutions censuring Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton. Impeachment is exclusive only in that it is the sole tool available to Congress to remove an official from office and that Congress is constitutionally prohibited from imposing any additional punishment following impeachment and conviction beyond removal and disqualification from holding future federal office.

As for the Constitution's prohibition on bills of attainder, a censure resolution would violate that constitutional prohibition only if it imposed a "punishment" as envisioned by the Bill of Attainder Clause. While expressions of disapproval through censure or similar mechanisms do not carry direct legal consequences, legal penalties potentially attach to an individual's refusal to comply with a valid congressional subpoena.

Under federal statute, a person "summoned as a witness" to provide testimony or produce documents upon the request of either house of Congress and who is found to have "willfully" refused to provide "pertinent" documents or testimony is guilty of a misdemeanor and may be subject to a fine and imprisonment.

There are several legal limitations on Congress's use of the criminal contempt statute. Like other criminal provisions, the criminal contempt of Congress statute cannot be used to prosecute constitutionally protected conduct.

There are additional limits on the use of the criminal contempt statute that arise from the manner in which the criminal contempt of Congress provision is enforced. The executive branch has taken the position—based on both statutory interpretation and the constitutional separation of powers—that federal prosecutors retain discretion in deciding whether to begin a criminal contempt of Congress prosecution.

For example, when the President directs or endorses non-compliance with a subpoena, such as where the official refuses to disclose information pursuant to the President's decision that the information is protected by executive privilege, past practice suggests that the Department of Justice DOJ is unlikely to pursue a prosecution for criminal contempt. The inherent contempt power is a constitutionally based power given to each house to arrest and detain an individual found to be "obstruct[ing] the performance of the duties of the legislature.

In an inherent contempt proceeding, the House or Senate can authorize the arrest of a suspected contemnor by the body's Sergeant at Arms. Several non-statutory tools inhere exclusively to the House of Representatives. Some of these tools have limited legal effect. For example, through resolutions of inquiry, the House may make non-binding requests for information from certain executive branch officials. Other non-statutory tools have weighty and, potentially, legally consequential effects.

The House may impeach federal government officials for "high Crimes and Misdemeanors. They are limited in their effect, however, given that they are neither legally binding on the agency nor judicially enforceable; instead, "[t]he effectiveness of such a resolution derives from comity between the branches of government rather than from any elements of compulsion. Resolutions of inquiry are most typically used to request documents or information that pertains to foreign affairs, defense, or intelligence matters.

The Constitution establishes a bifurcated process for impeachment and removal, with the House of Representatives accorded the "sole Power" to impeach federal government officials, and the Senate given "the sole Power to try all Impeachments," with the immediate consequence of Senate conviction being an official's removal from office.

Decisions by the House to impeach executive officials have been rare—in total, two Presidents and one member of the Cabinet have been impeached by the House. The Constitution defines who may be impeached and stipulates the types of misconduct that rise to the level of impeachable offenses. Second, the Constitution specifies the types of behavior that justify impeachment. A "civil Officer" is not subject to impeachment and removal unless the officer has committed "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.

Congress has afforded the term a broad reading. For example, in impeachment proceedings against Judge Alcee L. Hastings, the accompanying House report described "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" as embracing "misconduct that damages the state and the operations of government institutions.

The House may use the federal courts as a way to influence agency action. That said, because of standing and other justiciability issues, the House's authority to use the courts as a conduit for controlling agencies appears to relate principally to subpoena enforcement.

Recent practice, approved by the U. District Court for the District of Columbia, indicates that the House may authorize a civil claim in federal court to enforce a subpoena. Civil enforcement cases brought by an authorized committee, especially if triggered by an agency official's refusal to produce documents or testimony, generally require a court to evaluate both Congress's oversight powers and the official's articulated justification for non-compliance with the subpoena.

For example, in , the D. Lynch instructing DOJ to comply with a House committee subpoena. In addition to subpoena enforcement lawsuits, a federal district court has held that the House has standing to challenge expenditures of funds made without an appropriation from Congress. Burwell , the court held that if an agency's expenditure of funds is taken in violation of the "specific proscription" in Article I that "[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law," then the House has standing to remedy that constitutional violation.

Some oversight tools are available exclusively to the Senate. Through its "advice and consent" responsibility, the Senate plays an integral role in the performance of two constitutionally prescribed executive functions—the appointment of important government officials and completion of treaties between the United States and foreign nations or international bodies.

Like the House, the Senate may seek to enforce a subpoena by instituting civil proceedings in federal court. While the House's civil enforcement of subpoenas may occur on an ad hoc basis, a federal statute provides procedures for subpoena enforcement by the Senate. By statute, the U. District Court for the District of Columbia is granted jurisdiction to hear claims "to secure a declaratory judgment concerning the validity of, or to prevent a threatened refusal or failure to comply with, any subp[o]ena or order issued by the Senate or committee or subcommittee" thereof.

The Constitution conditions the full performance of two essential executive branch functions on the assent of the Senate. The Appointments Clause and the Treaty Clause respectively authorize the President to make certain appointments to important governmental positions and to finalize treaties with foreign nations or international bodies on behalf of the United States only after receiving the "advice and consent" of the Senate.

As noted, the Appointments Clause establishes that principal "Officers of the United States," and those "inferior Officers" whose appointments have not been vested in the President alone, department heads, or "the Courts of Law," must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

The ability of government officials to perform the duties of a vacant office is generally governed by the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of Vacancies Act , although other statutes may supplement or supersede that statute. The Senate's advice-and-consent function under the Appointments Clause serves as a significant check on the executive branch, one which the Senate may use not only to approve or reject presidential nominees, but also to influence who is nominated for certain important offices and what a nominee will do in office if confirmed.

For example, the threat that a simple majority of Senators will block a presidential nominee can be used by the Senate to persuade the President to nominate an individual agreeable to most Senators. In his resignation letter, Attorney General Elliot Richardson asserted that his decision to resign was based not only on the fact that he had empowered the special prosecutor with a large measure of independence and imposed limitations on his removal, but also because, "[a]t many points throughout the confirmation hearings [for Attorney General], [he had] reaffirmed [his] intentions to assure the independence of the special prosecutor.

Similarly, the Treaty Clause of the Constitution stipulates that the President may not ratify a treaty between the United States and a foreign nation or international body without senatorial consent.

The Clause states that the President "shall have the Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur. The advice-and-consent function in connection with the President's treaty-making power enables the Senate to serve as a substantial check on the execution of the President's foreign relations power. It may also supply its consent subject to certain conditions e. As stated above, the impeachment and removal process involves distinct roles for both houses of Congress.

If the House votes to impeach an official, it will then forward articles of impeachment to the Senate, which has "the sole Power to try all Impeachments. While the full Senate votes on whether to convict an impeached official, under Impeachment Rule XI, the Senate may order the Presiding Officer of the Senate to establish a committee of Senators to receive evidence and take testimony prior to the vote. United States , which concerned the impeachment and conviction in the Senate of Walter L.

Nixon, Jr. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. During the proceedings in the Senate, the Senate established a committee under Impeachment Rule XI to receive evidence. The Supreme Court held that the former judge's claim posed a nonjusticiable political question and was therefore not subject to judicial review. Among the tools to influence agency action available to congressional committees of both houses are the power of investigative oversight and the use of committee report language.

The efficacy of these tools, which provide committees with "enormous influence over executive branch doings," reflects both committees' substantial role in the legislative system and their unique relationship with the agencies they oversee.

Congressional committees can significantly influence agency action through investigative oversight. These investigations may uncover and publicize agency abuse of authority or maladministration, prompting a legislative response or immediate change in policies by the investigated agency itself. Congress's power to conduct investigations complements its more prominent power to legislate and appropriate funds.

Because each house of Congress has largely delegated its constitutional oversight powers to its standing committees, congressional oversight investigations typically are carried out by congressional committees and subcommittees. Congress has also enacted a series of laws that buttress committee investigative powers. Along with the criminal contempt statute already discussed, the federal perjury, false statements, and obstruction of congressional proceeding statutes also criminalize conduct that may inhibit a congressional committee's ability to exercise its oversight power.

Instead, enforcement—as with all criminal provisions—is carried out by the executive branch. With regard to perjury, false statements, and obstruction, a committee may refer a possible offense to DOJ with a recommendation that an investigation be initiated, but the ultimate decision on prosecution is retained by the executive branch. Federal law does, however, directly empower committees to obtain an immunity order from a federal court to compel a witness who has asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to testify.

While Congress's oversight and investigatory powers are broad, they are not unlimited. Besides jurisdictional limitations and other procedural requirements imposed by each house or a particular committee's rules, other constitutional principles restrict committee investigations. Because the authority to conduct oversight and investigations is implicit in the Constitution's vesting of legislative power in Congress, any inquiry must be undertaken "in aid of the legislative function.

In addition, because a congressional inquiry is part of "lawmaking," a congressional committee engaged in an investigation generally must observe applicable constitutional restrictions and respect validly asserted constitutionally based privileges. Assertions of executive privilege may be invoked to limit a committee's authority to obtain information from executive branch agencies. The deliberative process privilege is often implicated during committee investigations into agency decisionmaking, and as a result, may prompt conflict between committees and agencies.

While the Supreme Court has found the presidential communications privilege to be implied in the Constitution, the legal source from which the deliberative process privilege stems is less clear. Whereas one court has suggested that the privilege "is primarily a common law privilege," another has held that it has "constitutional dimension[s].

While legislative enactments have the force and effect of law, committees may also use non-binding report language associated with passed legislation to influence agency action. In general, committee report language refers to any information provided in a report that accompanies legislation approved by the committee. The purpose of committee report language can range from explaining the committee's interpretation of certain provisions of the bill to directly articulating a requirement or prohibition on the agency which may not be directly referenced in the bill's text.

In the appropriations context, report language has been used as a non-binding alternative to the types of committee controls held unconstitutional in Chadha. As one appellate court has noted, "there is nothing unconstitutional about. Individual Members also have several tools at their disposal to influence agency action.

Members may seek the disclosure of information from agency officials through voluntary cooperation. And, because state legislatures controlled their own commerce, the federal Congress was unable to enter into credible trade agreements with foreign powers to open markets for American goods, in part, by threatening to restrict foreign access to the American market.

The result of all this was a nationwide economic downturn that, rightly or not, was blamed on ruinous policies enacted by democratically-elected legislatures.

In , political dissatisfaction with the economic situation led to a convention convened in Philadelphia to remedy this state of affairs. The new Constitution it proposed, addressed debtor relief laws with the Contracts Clause of Article I, Section 10, which barred states from "impairing the obligation of contracts. To address the problems of interstate trade barriers and the ability to enter into trade agreements, it included the Commerce Clause, which grants Congress the power "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.

The international commerce power also gave Congress the power to abolish the slave trade with other nations, which it did effective on January 1, , the very earliest date allowed by the Constitution. But, in the words of Chief Justice John Marshall, the "enumeration" of three distinct commerce powers in the Commerce Clause "presupposes something not enumerated, and that something, if we regard the language or the subject of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce of a State.

Ogden Marshall, C. So, for example, even when combined with the Necessary and Proper Clause giving Congress power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution its enumerated powers, the Commerce Clause did not give Congress power to touch slavery that was allowed by state governments within their borders.

The text of the Commerce Clause raises at least three questions of interpretation: What is the meaning of "commerce"? What is the meaning of "among the several states"? And what is the meaning of "to regulate"? Some have claimed that each of these terms of the Commerce Power had, at the time of the founding, an expansive meaning in common discourse, while others claim the meaning was more limited.

In addition to other pervasive evidence of the public meaning of these terms, the slavery issue helps clarify the original public meaning of these terms at the time of their enactment. Among the several states meant between one state and others, not within a state, where slavery existed as an economic activity.

From the founding until today, the meaning of "commerce" has not been much changed. Perhaps its only expansion by the Supreme Court came in when the Court held that commerce included "a business such as insurance," which for a hundred years had been held to be solely a subject of internal state regulation.

United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Instead, the modern growth of Congress's regulatory powers has been allowed by the courts adopting an expansive reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause to give Congress power over a broad range of intrastate economic activities with a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce, when such regulation is essential to the regulation of interstate commerce narrowly defined.

Darby , the "power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce among the states. Maryland But in McCulloch , Chief Justice Marshall insisted that "should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal.

Thus, the Court expanded Congress power over interstate commerce in a way that gave it power over the national economy. In the s, the Rehnquist Court treated these New Deal cases as the high water mark of congressional power.

In the cases of U. Lopez and U.